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Foreword
Introduction to the Symposium on
Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases
Carl T. Bogus*
It is estimated that approximately 20% of all girls and 5-10%
of all boys across the globe are sexually abused by adults.' Those
statistics are always a shock to those of us who do not specialize in
this area. I heard these numbers for the first time about twenty
years ago when I was teaching an Evidence course at the Rutgers
University School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. Our Evidence
casebook included many cases of child sexual abuse, as do most
Evidence casebooks. After class one day, a couple of students
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.
1. See Jennifer J. Freyd et al., The Science of Child Abuse, 308 Sci. 501,
501 (2005). See also John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in
America, 42 FAm. L.Q. 449, 461 (2008) (citing a study by David Finkelhor that
found that 19.2% of women and 8 .6 % of men had been sexually victimized as
children); Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the People Who Believe
the Children?: The Need for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay
Exception Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 207, 207-08 (1995) (citing various
studies that place estimates of child sexual abuse between twelve and thirty-
eight percent for girls and between three and sixteen percent for boys). Some
estimates are higher. See, e.g., Sam Torres, Review of Professional
Publications, 68 FED. PROBATION 68 (2004) (reviewing a book by J. L. Mullings
et al. that estimated that 2 8 % of girls and 16% of boys are sexually abused
before the age of sixteen). Like everything else on this subject, estimates
about the prevalence of child sexual are controversial. Among other factors,
estimates will vary depending on how surveyors define "child" and "sexual
abuse."
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observed that if our class of roughly one-hundred students was
representative of the general population, about a dozen of us in
that classroom had been sexually abused as children. I was
stunned. I had not previously realized the prevalence of the
problem. Moreover, visualizing the statistic in these terms-as a
significant portion of the students who were looking up at me from
their seats-made the numbers horrifyingly real to me.
And yet after hearing the statistics, it is easy to forget them.
Perhaps we want to forget them. Child sexual abuse is simply
something most of do not want to contemplate. That itself is part
of the problem. There are surely people at Penn State and in
State College, Pennsylvania, who are ashamed that they did not
do more when they learned, or even just had reason to suspect,
that a former university football coach was sexually abusing
young boys. In their lonely hours, they undoubtedly ask
themselves, "Why did I not act?" or "Why did I not act more
decisively?" It is comforting for the rest of us to think the
explanation lies with the subculture of Penn State football. How
disturbing it would be to acknowledge that the failure to act was
influenced not as much by a unique Penn State football subculture
as it was by the wider culture to which we all belong. It is
certainly true that Penn State is a beloved institution and that
many will strive to protect its good name. It is surely also true
that luminaries within the Penn State football program are
admired and powerful members of the community. But there are
beloved institutions and admired and powerful figures in every
community. Consider, for example, the longstanding problem of
sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests, with bishops often
protecting not the children, but the predators.
As I write these words, the media is presently debating the
question of whether, twenty-one years ago, Woody Allen sexually
abused his adopted daughter Dylan Farrow, who was then seven
years of age. The issue reemerged when Dylan, now twenty-eight,
married, and living under another name, wrote an open letter
lamenting that-notwithstanding the well-known allegations-
Hollywood was continuing to honor Woody Allen by bestowing
upon him a Golden Globe lifetime achievement award and
nominating him for an Oscar. 2 A week later, Woody Allen
2. Dylan Farrow, An Open Letter from Dylan Farrow, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
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responded in an op-ed in which he claimed that the case had been
thoroughly investigated at the time by the Child Sexual Abuse
Clinic at the Yale-New Haven Hospital, which wrote a report
concluding that Dylan had not been sexually abused and that the
allegations were either "made up by an emotionally vulnerable
child who was caught up in a disturbed family and was responding
to the stresses of that family" or "that Dylan was coached or
influenced by her mother, Mia Farrow."3 Woody Allen claimed
that, among other things, the investigators took into account that
he took and passed a polygraph test while Mia Farrow declined to
take one. 4 In the cacophony of media comment stimulated by
Dylan Farrow's open letter, one of the most sensible came from
Slate columnist (and lawyer) Dahlia Lithwick, who observed that
we sensibly cannot try allegations such as these in the court of
public opinion because that court has no arbiter, no rules of
evidence, no method for separating lies from truth, and no
commitment to fairness or responsibility.s "[T]he Court of Public
Opinion is what we used to call villagers with flaming torches,"
Lithwick wrote. 6 True enough, but what should we do with Dylan
Farrow's claim that we do her a terrible disservice by honoring
Allen with awards, or arguably by purchasing tickets to his
movies?
The legal system, of course, is the place where allegations
about child sexual abuse must be formally investigated and
adjudicated, and where matters involving child custody, freedom
1, 2014), http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/an-open-letter-from-
dylan-farrow/? php=true& type=blogs& r=0. The letter was posted on
columnist Nicholas Kristofs blog. Kristof devoted his column, published in
the newspaper that same day, to Dylan's letter. See Nicholas Kristof, Dylan
Farrow's Story, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02
/02/opinion/sunday/kristof-dylan-farrows-story.html.
3. Woody Allen, Woody Allen Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, at
SR-9.
4. Allen's polygraph argument is of particular interest to me because,
as an evidence teacher, I often ask my students to consider not only whether
polygraph test results should be admissible but whether a willingness or
refusal to take a polygraph test should be admissible, and if so, under what
circumstances.
5. Dahlia Lithwick, Woody Allen v. Dylan Farrow: The Court of Public
Opinion is Now Open, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news and politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/woody allen v dylan farrow the c
ourt of public opinion is now in session.html.
6. Id.
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or incarceration, or payment of damages are at stake. Evidence
casebooks typically contain many child sexual abuse cases because
this subject area presents enormous challenges for the legal
system. The testimony of a young child is often essential, but that
testimony is often exceedingly difficult for young children to give.
Very young children may not understand exactly what happened
to them, and they may have considerable difficulty communicating
what they do understand. The person who abused them may be
someone they love and trust-a parent, stepparent, uncle,
neighbor, teacher, camp counselor, cleric-and they may be
emotionally torn about accusing this person of terrible things.
They may be intimidated at being questioned by strangers or by
the settings in which they find themselves, such as police stations
and courthouses. A child may have been able to communicate to
someone they know, or to a professional who carefully built a
rapport with the child in a comfortable setting, but freeze when
thrust into a formal setting and surrounded by strangers. Yet, the
legal system can protect children only so far because criminal
defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront their
accusers.7 Moreover, even when the Confrontation Clause is not
7. Federal law allows courts to permit children who are unable to
testify because of fear or who would suffer emotional trauma to testifying
outside the defendant's presence via one-way closed circuit television. See 18
U.S.C. § 3509 (2006). This statute predated Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), which dramatically changed Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. The author of Crawford, Justice Antonin Scalia, believes that
the Confrontation Clause does not permit children to testify outside the
presence of the defendant. He once wrote:
Because of this subordination of explicit constitutional text to
currently favored public policy, the following scene can be played out
in an American courtroom for the first time in two centuries: A
father whose young daughter has been given over to the exclusive
custody of his estranged wife, or a mother whose young son has been
taken into custody by the State's child welfare department, is
sentenced to prison for sexual abuse on the basis of testimony by a
child the parent has not seen or spoken to for many months; and the
guilty verdict is rendered without giving the parent so much as the
opportunity to sit in the presence of the child, and to ask, personally
or through counsel, "it is really not true, is it, that I-your father (or
mother) whom you see before you-did these terrible things?"
Perhaps that is a procedure today's society desires; perhaps (though
I doubt it) it is even a fair procedure; but it is assuredly not a
procedure permitted by the Constitution.
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directly implicated, our legal system has long rejected hearsay
testimony that does not fit within carefully prescribed exceptions.8
If all of this were not enough, the legal system must deal
intelligently with the phenomena of repressed and recovered
memories. Moreover, young children may be highly suggestible,
and for them the boundaries between reality and imagination may
be permeable. As illustrated by the Farrow-Allen case, there may
be allegations that one parent, engaged in bitter child custody
battle, was able to stimulate false memories of abuse, or that well-
meaning but inept investigators may themselves implant false
memories. To say the least, the legal system has to be far better
informed about these phenomena than the court of public opinion.
There is no area where the demands on the legal system to be
well informed about what psychologists have learned are higher.
For that reason, we assembled both some of the leading
psychology researchers and legal scholars working in this area.
They came together for a live conference at the Roger Williams
University School of Law on February 22, 2013, and thereafter
wrote the articles that are published in this symposium edition of
the Roger Williams University Law Review. 9 After the conference,
the law review editors were fortunate to obtain the article: The
Importance of Conducting In-camera Testimony of Child Witnesses
in Court Proceedings - A Comparative Legal Analysis of Relevant
Domestic Relations, Juvenile Justice and Criminal Cases, written
by Justice Laureen A. D'Ambra of the Rhode Island Family Court,
who had not participated. Given that the article was in line with
the content of this symposium, the editors decided to include the
piece in this edition as well.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, Crawford itself did not go that far. It held: "Where testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required: unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination."
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. The federal statute does permit cross-examination,
and therefore appears to satisfy Crawford, at least for the time being.
8. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, only "testimonial"
statements implicate the Sixth Amendment, that is, accusations made for
potential use in criminal proceedings. Id. at 51.
9. We often reverse the usual symposium format in which contributors
present papers they have already written at the live conference. We think it
is beneficial for contributors to be informed by the formal and informal
discussions that occur at the conference prior to writing their papers.
2014] 321
322 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:317
We are very proud to publish the work you will find in these
pages, and hope that people who are interested in this area-and
especially people who are working in the area-will find it both
illuminating and useful.
